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Stricter laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement. Since enforcement activity depends both on available 
tax revenue and the honesty of officials, the optimal legal standard of a benevolent government is increasing in 
per-capita  income  and decreasing  in  officials’ corruption.  In  contrast  to  the  “tollbooth  view”  of  regulation,  the 
standard chosen by a self-interested government is a non-monotonic function of officials’ corruption, and can be 
either  lower  or  higher  than  that  chosen  by  a  benevolent  regulator.  International  evidence  on  environmental 
regulation  show  that  standards  correlate  positively  with  percapita  income,  and  negatively  with  corruption, 
consistently with the model’s predictions for benevolent governments. 
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  1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Designing a law cannot neglect the question of its enforcement. Stricter and more complex
laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement machinery. This simple point implies
that the factors that aﬀect the deterrence of enforcement should also aﬀect the severity of
the law.1 On the one hand, a wealthier society can devote a greater amount of budgetary
resources to the policing of laws, and thereby can aﬀord more ambitious legal standards. On
the other, a more corrupt bureaucracy blunts the deterrence of enforcement, and thereby
requires less ambitious legal standards.
In this paper we show that these results hold if the regulator pursues the maximization
of social welfare: if enforcers are corrupt, a benevolent regulator will choose less demanding
legal standards than in the absence of corruption. More generally, such a regulator will
respond to a increase in enforcers’ corruption by lowering society’s legal standards. In
contrast, a self-interested regulator may respond to greater corruption either by tightening
or by relaxing legal standards, depending on circumstances. This result contrasts with the
“tollbooth view” of regulation proposed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer
(2002, hereafter DLLS), which suggests that corruption should be associated with tighter
regulation if regulators are self-interested. Another result that contrasts with the “tollbooth
view” is that in our setting the legal standard chosen by a self-interested regulator may be
less stringent than that chosen by a benevolent one.
We make these points in the context of two alternative, but isomorphic, settings where
market failures warrant intervention by a regulator. The market failures that we consider
1Starting with Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970), a large literature has investigated the optimal enforcement
of laws (see Polinsky and Shavell, 2000, and Shavell, 1993). The point that the design of laws must take into
account the cost of their enforcement is forcefully made by Holmes and Sunstein (1999).
—1—stem either from informational externalities or from real ones. As an example of informa-
tional externality, we consider an economy where product quality is unobservable, so that
each seller’s quality choice aﬀects the market price. As a real externality, we study an
economy where environmental quality is a public good. In both cases, in the absence of
regulation producers would choose ineﬃciently low quality, respectively resulting in poor
products or in a polluted environment. The government can remedy the problem, imposing
a minimum standard and policing it by enforcement activity to detect and punish violators.
We test the predictions of the model on international data for environmental regulation,
and ﬁnd that regulatory standards have a positive correlation with per-capita income and a
negative one with the degree of corruption, consistently with our model’s predictions for the
case of a benevolent regulator. Therefore, also our evidence does not accord with DLLS’s
“tollbooth view”.
This paper is related to a vast literature that highlights the eﬀect of corruption on regu-
lation and enforcement. The idea that corruptibility of oﬃcials gives rise to rent-seeking by
oﬃcials can already be found in Krueger (1974) and Rose-Ackerman (1978). Banerjee (1997)
proves that such rent-seeking behavior is compatible with a benevolent government, in the
presence of agency problems within the public sector, and Acemoglu and Verdier (2000)
show that the costs entailed by this agency problem can make public intervention unde-
sirable.2 The assumption that regulators may pursue a self-interested objective is present
in McChesney (1987) and DLLS, who also document a positive cross-country correlation
2While the social costs stemming from corrupt enforcers are much discussed, little empirical work doc-
ument these costs and explore the mechanism of corruption. An interesting exception is a recent paper on
driving licences by Bertrand, Djankov, Rema and Mullainathan (2007), showing that bureaucrats make it
hard to pass the driving exam by failing individuals arbitrarily, irrespective of their skill. This red tape in
turn implies that applicants often bribe bureaucrats to facilitate the process, and thereby incapable drivers
often get a license.
—2—between the stringency of entry regulations and corruption. The problem of regulatory cap-
ture is analyzed also in the literature on optimal regulation under asymmetric information
(Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993).
We focus on regulation and public enforcement as remedies for market failures, but
in principle one could consider more decentralized mechanisms: the enforcement of rules
may be entrusted to private agents via their appeal to courts and even the design of the
rules may be delegated to private agencies. These alternative mechanisms have limitations,
however. One cannot rely on a plaintiﬀ’s initiative to enforce laws if documenting violations
is very costly or unfeasible for individuals (as for experience goods), if the damage is socially
diﬀuse (as for pollution), or if the perpetrator’s wealth greatly exceeds that of the potential
plaintiﬀ (leading to “subversion of law”).3 Also self-regulation may lead to insuﬃciently
stringent enforcement: DeMarzo, Fishman and Hagerty (2001) show that a self-regulatory
organization mandated to maximize the welfare of its members chooses laxer enforcement
than customers would.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains that legal standards are beneﬁcial
in the presence of either informational or real externalities, and that their formal analysis is
the same in the two cases. Section 3 lays out the model for the case of informational exter-
nalities, and characterizes the design and enforcement of the legal standard by a benevolent
government. Section 4 examines how the standard is aﬀected by the presence of corrupt bu-
reaucrats. Section 5 explores how the results change when the government is self-interested.
Section 6 presents the case of real externalities, in which legal standards refer to environ-
mental regulation. In Section 7 we test the model’s predictions using cross-country data
3For an analysis of the choice between diﬀerent enforcement regimes, see Glaeser and Shleifer (2003).
—3—about environmental regulation. Section 8 concludes.
2 Rationale of Legal Standards
In our model, the rationale of legal standards arises from a market failure. We analyze two
cases: in the ﬁrst, the market failure arises from an informational externality; in the other,
from a real externality.
An informational externality arises when buyers cannot observe the quality chosen by in-
dividual sellers. Therefore, each seller’s choice of production technology aﬀects the expected
quality and the price of the industry’s output. But each producer, being a price taker, fails
to take this into account, and chooses suboptimal quality. A real externality occurs when
an agent’s decision aﬀects the payoﬀ of others directly rather than via the information con-
veyed by the market mechanism. We analyze real externalities in a public-good setting,
where ﬁrms’ technological choices aﬀect consumers’ utility via the level of pollution. Each
consumer, being small, has no incentive to penalize polluting ﬁrms by refraining to patronize
them. Hence, the environment’s quality will be suboptimally low.
We show that, in the presence of either type of externality, the optimal legal standard
chosen by a benevolent legislator has the same characterization. In both cases, social welfare
can be written — up to a constant — as:
W = u(s) − c(s)+y − e,
where u(s)−c(s) is the surplus (consumers’ utility minus ﬁrms’ costs) associated with legal
standard s,a n dy − e is the endowment net of enforcement costs. In both cases, the legal
standard constrains the technological choice of ﬁrms: with informational externalities, it
sets a minimum quality for the goods that they sell; with real externalities, it limits the
—4—environmental harm caused by their production process.
Since ﬁrms have the incentive to deviate from the legal standard, in both settings the
standard must be assisted by appropriate enforcement, by ensuring that the following in-
centive constraint holds:
c(s) 6 c(q)+L(q,s,l,e), ∀q 6= s.
Under this constraint, ﬁrms prefer to abide by the law rather than deviating to an alternative
choice q and paying the expected penalty L, which in turn depends on the actual penalty
l and the enforcement activity e. In setting these variables, the government must take into
account also the feasibility constraint
e 6 y − c(s),
that is, the resources devoted to enforcement activity, e, cannot exceed the economy’s per-
capita endowment y net of the resources used in the production of the quality good c(s).
In what follows, we develop the analysis in detail for the case of the informational
externality between producers and consumers of a quality good (Sections 3, 4 and 5). We
then deal more brieﬂy with the case of real externalities (Section 6), where legal standards
refer to environmental regulation.
3 Quality Standards
In this section we illustrate the basic idea in terms of the relationship between the buyer and
the producer of a “quality good”, i.e., an object whose quality is not observed by the buyer
but aﬀects his valuation of the good. The quality of the good is chosen by the producer,
and it is not observable by the government except via the costly enforcement of a minimum
standard. Therefore, we have a moral hazard problem with costly monitoring between the
—5—government and the producer.
3.1 Firms
The quality good is produced by identical ﬁrms, uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Firms operate under constant returns to scale and compete à la Bertrand. The proﬁt
from selling a unit of the good is a function of its quality, which aﬀects both the price that
consumers are willing to pay and the production cost.4 The ﬁrms’ proﬁts are π = v(q)−c(q),
where v(q) is the unit price of a good of quality q and c(q) is its cost. The cost function is
increasing and convex in q,w i t hc(0) = 0. The market game is one-shot: we do not consider
repeated sales.5
3.2 Consumers
The utility function of the representative consumer is deﬁned over the consumption of two
goods: a continuous and homogeneous good x and the quality good. All magnitudes are
measured in units of the homogeneous good (the “numeraire”). The consumer demands a
single unit of the quality good and spends the rest of his disposable income on the numeraire
good. His utility is:
U = x + u(q) (1)
where u(q), the utility drawn from the quality good, is increasing and concave in q,w i t h
u(0) = 0. Therefore, the demand for this good is elastic in the quality dimension but
4The quality measure q can be seen as a summary measure of several dimensions of “quality”. For instance,
in the case of chicken, it could be a synthetic index of the quality of chicken feed, the preservatives added to
the meat, the method used to raise chicken, etc. This implies that a producer can raise the quality q either
along a particular dimension (the “intensive margin”), or by including a previously neglected dimension (the
“extensive margin” of quality). By the same token, a regulator can mandate higher standards either by
imposing more stringent criteria along given dimensions (a “stricter” law) or by increasing the number of
parameters considered (a more “complete” law).
5In a context with repeated interactions, the producers’ moral hazard may be tempered via reputation-
building.
—6—inelastic in the quantity dimension: the good’s reservation price depends on q,w h i l et h e
quantity is ﬁxed at 1 unit.
The consumer’s budget constraint is
x + v(q) 6 y + π − t (2)
where the expression on the left-hand side is the consumer’s total spending, y is his (positive)
initial endowment, and t is the net tax burden (taxes minus transfers). Taxes are assumed
to be used only to pay for enforcement, so that in the absence of enforcement t =0 .
3.3 Unregulated Quality
If quality is observable, the ﬁrst-best allocation emerges as the competitive market equilib-
rium. The ﬁrst best is found by maximizing expression (1) with respect to x and q, subject
to the budget constraint (2) and to the zero-proﬁt condition:
π = v(q) − c(q)=0 , (3)
since this is equivalent to maximizing social welfare:
max
q W = y + u(q) − c(q). (4)
As social welfare is a concave function of quality q, the necessary and suﬃcient condition
for its maximization is:
u0(q)=c0(q). (5)
The value of q that solves (5) is the ﬁrst-best (fb) level of quality qfb. W ed e n o t et h e
c o r r e s p o n d i n gl e v e lo fs o c i a lw e l f a r eb yWfb.
This allocation coincides with the Nash equilibrium of an extensive-form Bertrand game,
where ﬁrms choose the quality q of the good they produce and a price function v(q).T h e
—7—strategy of ﬁrm j is a vector sj =( qj,v(qj,q −j),w h e r eq−j is the vector of qualities chosen
by competing ﬁrms. A Nash equilibrium obtains when all ﬁrms choose the ﬁrst-best quality
and price (qfb,v(qfb)),s i n c en oﬁrm can proﬁtably deviate from it.6
If instead product quality is privately unobservable, then ﬁrms set quality at its minimum
level: q =0 .7 No positive level of quality is an equilibrium: if consumers expect this level,
any ﬁrm that deviates by providing lower quality will make proﬁts. In the next section we
show that such market failure can be tempered by legal standards.
3.4 Regulated Quality
If the government’s objective is to maximize social welfare, it can intervene to reduce the
market failure described above, by designing a law that sets a minimum quality standard s
and a penalty function l(q,s) setting the liability of violators, and by choosing the resources
e assigned to enforcement. We assume that the penalty is monetary8 and cannot exceed an
upper bound l 0 y −t+π. This upper bound arises from limited liability, and implies that
the ﬁrst-best cannot be achieved.9
6There are three possible deviations. First, choosing a diﬀerent quality qj 6= q
fb and vj = v(q
fb) is not
ap r o ﬁtable deviation since qj >q
fb implies losses, while qj <q
fb implies zero demand. Second, setting a
diﬀerent price vj 6= v(q
fb) and qj = q
fb implies losses if vj <v (q
fb) and zero demand if vj >v (q
fb).F i n a l l y ,
no ﬁrm will choose to deviate by setting both a price vj 6= v(q
fb) and a quality qj 6= q
fb.I fa l lo t h e rﬁrms
oﬀer the ﬁrst-best quality and price, no consumer will accept a combination of price vj 6= v(q
fb) and quality
qj 6= q
fb such that ﬁrm j makes zero proﬁts, by the very deﬁnition of a ﬁrst-best allocation. A fortiori, no
consumer will accept a combination of price vj 6= v(q
fb) and quality qj 6= q
fb such that ﬁrm j makes positive
proﬁts.
7We assume that producers cannot oﬀer a quality guarantee, because it is too costly for consumers to
verify. For instance, it would be prohibitively expensive for a consumer to check whether a chicken in the
supermarket was raised with hormones or whether it is free-range, or whether the electromagnetic waves of
a portable phone exceed a safety threshold.
8The model could accommodate a non-monetary sanction, for instance imprisonment. The social cost of
imprisonment should then be accounted for in the expression for social welfare. In this case, the optimal
monetary sanction is always maximal, as in our model (see below), but the non-monetary sanction may
not be set at the maximal level (Shavell, 1991). However, our results concerning the relationship between
standards and enforcement would be qualitatively unchanged.
9Another motivation for the upper bound can be the danger of “subversion of justice”: too high a penalty
may induce agents to invest in legal strategies to avoid punishment or in intimidating and bribing oﬃcials
—8—[Insert Figure 1]
Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of moves. First, the government chooses the standard s
and the level of enforcement e. Then, ﬁrms choose the quality level q and the corresponding
price v(q). Next, bureaucrats enforce the standard by inspecting ﬁrms, detecting non-
compliance with probability p(e).10 Finally, consumers buy the good at a price that reﬂects
its average quality.
The enforcement technology features decreasing marginal productivity: formally, p0(e) >
0 and p00(e) < 0.T h e ﬁrm’s expected liability is L = p(e)l(q,s). Thus with government
regulation, expected proﬁts become
π = v(qE) − c(q) − L. (6)
The quality good’s price v depends on the quality expected by consumers, qE, while its cost
c to the producer depends on the actual quality level, q.T h ev a r i a b l eL measures also the
government’s revenue from penalties, p(e) being the fraction of inspected ﬁrms.
Enforcement is ﬁnanced by taxes and revenue from penalties:11
e = t + L. (7)
Since ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts, a benevolent government will maximize the utility of consumers,
its control variables being consumption x, the quality standard s, the enforcement level e
(Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003, and Malik, 1990).
10In our setting, the government precommits to the probability of detection p(e) by allotting the resources
e to enforcement activity. One can think of e as the salaries paid to policemen: once hired, each policeman
detects violations with a probability determined by technological factors such as transport costs, population
density and social norms.
11Since utility is linear in x, we are assuming lump-sum taxation. However, distortionary taxes would not
change our qualitative results. The main diﬀerence would be that, by making enforcement more costly, tax
distortions would lower the optimal standard compared to lump-sum taxation.
—9—and the penalty l:
max
x,s,e,l
U = x + u(s)
subject to the incentive constraint
v(s) − c(s) 1 v(s) − c(q) − L(e,q,s,l), ∀q 6= s (8)
and to the feasibility constraint12
x = y − e − c(s) > 0, (9)
which ensures that consumption of the numeraire is non-negative. Substituting x from (9)
into the objective function, the problem becomes the maximization of social surplus
W = u(s) − c(s)+y − e, (10)
subject to the incentive constraint (8) and the feasibility constraint x > 0, as in the general
formulation of the government’s problem presented in Section 2.
As in Becker (1968), for any positive enforcement level it is optimal to set the penalty
at the maximum feasible level: l∗ = l if e>0.13 As a result, the expected penalty is
L(e,q,s,l)=p(e)l. To obtain the optimal enforcement level, we use the incentive constraint
(8) with equality, since the optimal policy requires this constraint to be binding. If not,
the government could increase welfare by lowering enforcement e, for any given l. Next,
notice that, in case of non-compliance, the ﬁrm would optimally deviate to a zero-quality
level, since this would minimize its cost.14 Finally, since the detection probability p(e)
12The constraint (9) derives from the consumer’s budget constraint (2) taken with equality, the govern-
ment’s budget constraint (7) and the deﬁnition of proﬁts (6), together with the feasibility constraint x > 0.
13Suppose in fact that l<l.T h e nl could be raised and e lowered while keeping L constant. The social
surplus u(s)−c(s) in the objective function would be unchanged but the enforcement cost e would be lower,
so that welfare W would be higher, contradicting the optimality of l.
14As a result, c(s)=c(0) + p(e)l. Recalling that c(0) = 0,w eh a v ec(s)=p(e)l.
—1 0—is monotonically increasing, it can be inverted to yield the enforcement level required to





From the properties of the production technology c(s) and the detection probability p(e),
it is immediate that the optimal enforcement b e is increasing and convex in the standard s
and decreasing in the maximum penalty l.15 The positive relationship between enforcement
and legal standards highlights their complementarity: a more demanding standard invites
non-compliance by ﬁrms, so that it must be assisted by more intensive policing.
Using this intermediate result, the problem can be restated simply as the choice of the
optimal standard s. Replacing the optimal enforcement (11) into the objective (10) and
taking into account the feasibility constraint (9), one obtains the Lagrangian:
max
s u(s) − c(s)+y − b e(s)+λ[y − b e(s) − c(s)], (12)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The ﬁrst-order conditions of this problem are:
u0(s∗)=( 1+λ∗)[c0(s∗)+b e0(s∗)], (13)
λ∗ [y − b e(s∗) − c(s∗)] = 0. (14)
The optimality condition (13) diﬀers from the ﬁrst-best condition u0(qfb)=c0(qfb), because
its right-hand side is larger. Therefore, by the concavity of u(·) it is immediate that:
Proposition 1 (Second-best standard) The optimal quality standard s∗ is lower than
the ﬁrst-best quality level qfb.





















> 0. The signs can be easily assessed recalling that
p(·) is increasing and concave, and that p
0−1(·)=1 /p
0(·).
—1 1—Intuitively, a benevolent government takes into account the enforcement costs of any
given standard, and therefore ends up choosing a standard s∗ that is less ambitious than the
ﬁrst-best level. With such a standard, ﬁrms will charge the competitive price v(s∗)=c(s∗),
and consumers will be willing to pay such a price: since the consumer surplus u(s) − c(s)
is zero for s =0and increasing for s below the ﬁrst-best level qfb,i tm u s tb en o n - n e g a t i v e
for the quality level s∗,t h a ti s ,u(s∗) > c(s∗).
[Insert Figure 2]
Figure 2 illustrates the second-best quality level. The convex function b e(s) shows the
minimum enforcement required for each standard from (11). The function is bounded
above by the feasibility constraint, which is decreasing and concave, as can be seen by
diﬀerentiating (9). The government’s preferences are described by a ﬁeld of concave, upward-
sloping social indiﬀerence curves, from the properties of the welfare function W(e,q):t h e i r
slope u0(q)−c0(q) is positive for quality levels lower than the ﬁrst best qfb, and is decreasing
by the concavity of u(q) and the convexity of c(q).
The ﬁgure illustrates the two possible cases that may arise. In the upper graph, the
feasibility constraint is not binding (λ∗ =0 ) and the optimal values of e and s are at the
tangency between the lowest indiﬀerence curve and the b e(s) function. In the lower graph,
instead, the feasibility constraint is binding (λ∗ > 0) . The second-best that corresponds
to the tangency point cannot be achieved, because income y is insuﬃcient to enforce the
second-best quality level. In this situation, the entire income is spent on the quality good.
The resulting constrained standard corresponds to the intersection between b e(s) and the
feasibility constraint.
—1 2—Figure 2 can be used also to investigate how the optimal quality standard s∗ responds
to changes in the maximum penalty l a n di ni n c o m ey. In the upper graph, where the
feasibility constraint is slack, an increase in the maximum penalty l shifts the b e(s) function
downward (except at zero), so that the incentive constraint moves to the right in Figure
2, raising the optimal standard. An increase in the endowment y leaves the equilibrium
unaﬀected, as it shifts the feasibility constraint upwards. In contrast, in the lower graph in
Figure 2, a larger y increases the equilibrium quality level because it moves the intersection
of the feasibility constraint with the b e(s) function to the right.16,17 The other comparative
statics are qualitatively identical to the case portrayed in the upper panel. These results
can be summarized as follows:
Corollary 1 (Comparative statics) The optimal quality standard s∗ is increasing in the
maximum penalty l, and is weakly increasing in the economy’s endowment y.
Note that for some parameters the optimal quality standard s∗ can be zero: laissez faire
can be optimal. For instance, if the enforcement technology features a ﬁxed cost and the
economy is so poor that its resources are insuﬃcient to cover this ﬁxed enforcement cost, a
benevolent government will opt for a laissez-faire policy, choosing s∗ = e∗ =0 .
16In standard principal-agent theory, this result emerges directly from limited liability: wealthier agents
can be punished more harshly, and therefore prodded to exert more eﬀort. In our setting, the mechanim
is more roundabout: greater wealth implies more tax revenue, which funds increased enforcement activity,
w h i c hi nt u r ns u s t a i n sah i g h e rs t a n d a r d .
17The result that the second-best quality level is increasing in income generalizes beyond the quasi-linear
utility case. For any preferences such that the marginal utility of quality is weakly increasing in income, the
ﬁrst-best quality level is itself increasing with income, which reinforces our result about the second-best.
—1 3—4 Corrupt enforcers
So far we have assumed enforcement to be implemented by honest oﬃcials: given a certain
level of enforcement e chosen by the government, the probability of detection is determined
by a technical relationship p(e). However, there may be agency problems within the bu-
reaucracy appointed to enforce standards: when enforcers are self-interested, they will try
to take advantage of their position to extract bribes from the ﬁrms that they inspect. By
doing so, they blunt the deterrence of enforcement, as pointed out by Becker and Stigler
(1974) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001). We show that the reduced eﬀectiveness of enforce-
ment due to corruptibility of oﬃcials leads to a lower standard. This parallels the ﬁnding
by Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) that in the presence of corruption the government may
optimally abstain from intervention.
To introduce corrupt enforcers in our setting, we assume that, upon inspecting a ﬁrm,
an oﬃcial can threaten to report it as failing to comply with the standard, irrespective of
whether this is true or not. However, the bribe that he can demand in exchange for not
reporting the ﬁrm will diﬀer in the two cases. If the ﬁrm truly failed to comply, upon
refusal to bribe the oﬃcial it can expect to be punished with the penalty l. Therefore, l
is the largest bribe that an oﬃcial can extract from a non-complying ﬁrm, in exchange for
not being reported and punished. If instead the ﬁrm did comply, it may refuse to pay the
oﬃcial and hope to demonstrate its innocence in court. But doing so may entail a cost if
the oﬃc i a l ’ sf a l s ee v i d e n c ew e r et oh o l du pi nc o u rt, due to a judicial mistake or to collusion
between judges and corrupt oﬃcials. Additional costs will arise from legal expenses. The
expected value of these costs, to be denoted by αl,w h e r e0 <α<1, is the largest sum that
—1 4—can be extorted from a complying ﬁrm.18
In this setting, the magnitude of α depends on how corrupt, unreliable and costly is the
judicial system. In a slightly more general setting where only some oﬃcials are corrupt,
the magnitude of α depends also on the fraction of corrupt oﬃcials, since this fraction will
determine the probability with which a complying ﬁrm will face extortion. In this case, α
reﬂects not only the judicial system’s failings but also the corruptibility of bureaucrats. For
brevity, we shall refer to it as the “degree of corruption”.
Since now the ﬁrm pays αl irrespective of compliance, it is more diﬃcult to incentivize
it for given enforcement e and penalty l. Formally, under the new incentive constraint the
ﬁrm pays the expected bribe αp(e)l if it complies and p(e)l if it does not comply:
v(s) − c(s) − αp(e)l 1 v(s) − c(q) − p(e)l, ∀q 6= s. (15)





where the tilde denotes the optimal values chosen under the assumption of corrupt enforcers.
As before, enforcement activity is increasing and convex in the standard s. Equation (16)
shows that with corruption the enforcement required to police a given standard s is larger
than the second-best level (11): e e(s) > b e(s), because extortion by bureaucrats makes it
harder to incentivize ﬁrms. Indeed, the enforcement required for a given standard s is
increasing in the degree of corruption, α.
The standard chosen by the government must also ensure that consumers are willing to
buy the quality good at the competitive price. In other words, one must worry that the
18The upper bound of α is 1 because if the expected loss from a trial were larger or equal to the penalty
l,t h eﬁrm would prefer to pay this penalty or the same amount to bribe an oﬃcial.
—1 5—consumers’ participation constraint u(s) > v(s) is met. While in the absence of corruption
this constraint always holds for the optimal quality s∗ (as discussed after Proposition 1),
with corruption consumers’ participation is not necessarily guaranteed: the expected bribe
increases the ﬁrms’ costs and thus may push the break-even price above consumers’ reser-
vation utility. To avoid market collapse, we must therefore explicitly impose the constraint:
u(s) > v(s)=c(s)+αp(e)l, (17)
where the equality indicates that the competitive price v(s) equals the production cost c(s)
plus the expected cost of extortion αp(e)l.
Formally, with corrupt enforcers the regulator’s problem is to maximize social welfare
(10) subject to the incentive constraint (16), the feasibility constraint (9) and the consumers’
participation constraint (17).19 The optimal standard with corrupt enforcers, sc,w h i c hi s
characterized as follows:
Proposition 2 (Standard with corrupt enforcers) The optimal standard sc with cor-
rupt enforcers is decreasing in the degree of corruption α and weakly increasing in per-capita
income y.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, corruption induces a lower legal standard because it has a “deterrence-
blunting eﬀect”: when enforcers are corrupt, policing a given standard requires more en-
forcement resources than otherwise, so that it is eﬃcient for the regulator to choose a less
ambitious standard than he would with loyal enforcers. By the same token, the higher the
19Since the feasibility constraint remains the same as in the setting with loyal oﬃcials, we are implicitly
assuming that the bribe income collected by corrupt enforcers is available to meet the societal resource
constraint. For instance, bribes can be spent on consumption of the numeraire or the quality good.
—1 6—degree of corruption, the less ambitious the standard. A corollary of this proposition is that
with corrupt enforcers the optimal standard is lower than the second-best level found in the
previous section, i.e. sc <s ∗.20
5 Self-interested regulator
So far, the government has been assumed to be benevolent, that is, to maximize social
welfare. However, a government may be captured by corrupt bureaucrats. In this case,
it may value the bribes that can be extracted from ﬁrms, as assumed in the “tollbooth
view” of regulation proposed by DLLS (2002).21 This theory assumes that regulators are
self-interested, and therefore use regulation to create rents and extract them through bribes.
DLLS (2002), who apply this principle to the design of entry regulation, state that “a direct
implication of the tollbooth hypothesis is that corruption levels and the intensity of entry
regulation are positively correlated” (pg. 26).
In this section, we explore if this purported prediction of the “tollbooth view” is upheld
within our model, once the government’s objective function is amended so as to coincide with
the expected bribes E(b) collected by oﬃcials — an extreme case of self-interested behavior
by the regulator. As in the previous section, bureaucrats are corrupt but now they capture
the government itself, which chooses the standard s and the enforcement level e so as to
maximize expected bribes E(b). We shall denote the standard chosen by the government in
20In our setting we take the degree of corruption α as exogenous. However, the result just shown in the
text survives even if the government can spend resources to mitigate corruption. In a former version of this
paper, we allowed the government to spend money both on policing ﬁrms and on monitoring oﬃcials, so
that the latter would not accept bribes. To this purpose, we assumed two layers of bureaucrats: low-level
and corruptible bureaucrats, assigned to policing ﬁrms, and high-level and incorruptible ones, whose only
task is to monitor their subordinates. Also in that context, potential corruption requires a lower standard,
because it increases the resources required to monitor lower-tier oﬃcials, just as in our context it increases
the resources required to police ﬁrms.
21Wade (1982) documents that, in Southern India, ministries received a pre-set kickback from the admin-
istration of the canal irrigation system.
—1 7—this case by ssi, where the superscript stands for “self-interested”.22
We will see that, in contrast to the “tollbooth view”, the legal standard of a self-interested
government is not always increasing in the degree of enforcers’ corruption, and may actu-
ally be lower than that chosen by a benevolent government. Intuitively, a self-interested
government must be careful not to choose too high a standard, since the latter raises the
costs of producers and thereby can endanger the viability of the ﬁrms from which bribes
are collected. This concern becomes more important as the degree of enforcers’ corruption
increases, which implies greater extortion costs for ﬁrms: to maintain ﬁrms’ viability, an
increase in the degree of corruption must be compensated by lower production costs, and
therefore by a lower standard.




subject to the incentive constraint (15), the feasibility constraint (9) and the participation
constraint (17). As in the previous sections, the penalty is set at its maximum level l.T h i s
is because a higher penalty directly raises the expected bribe, as shown by (18). Therefore,
the objective function can be rewritten as p(e)αl. To maximize it, the regulator wants
to choose the largest e that is consistent with the incentive compatibility, feasibility and
participation constraints.
To gain some insight about the solution of the problem, we represent three possible
cases in Figures 3, 4 and 5. In all three ﬁgures, the IC curve is increasing and convex in the
22Our self-interested regulator is like a corrupt central bureaucrat who optimizes bribe revenues. Indeed,
as we shall see, precisely for this reason in some cases he will compensate the “greed” of enforcers by choosing
softer standards to avoid killing the market. But here we do not compare centralized versus non-centralized
corruption. On this point, we refer the reader to DeLong and Shleifer (1993), who show that corruption
costs are lower with a corrupt central oﬃcial.
—1 8—(s,e) space, and the F curve is decreasing and concave, as in Figure 2. The only addition
relative to that ﬁgure is the PC locus, which corresponds to (17) taken with equality,
and indicates combinations of s and e where consumers are indiﬀerent between buying
and not buying the good. This locus is increasing up to the ﬁrst-best standard qfb,a n d
then decreasing, as can be shown by diﬀerentiating (17) implicitly.23 Intuitively, when the
standard is below the ﬁrst best, raising it allows ﬁrms to raise prices, generating a surplus
that can be appropriated by corrupt enforcers via greater extortion (higher e). Beyond the
ﬁrst best, further increases in the standard reduce the surplus produced by ﬁrms, so that
corrupt enforcers must correspondingly reduce extortion (lower e).
[Insert Figures 3, 4 and 5]
Points in the lens between the IC and the PC curve satisfy both the incentive compat-
ibility and the participation constraint. Sinc et h ef e a s i b l ep o i n t sa r et h o s et h a tl i eb e l o w
the F curve, all three constraints are satisﬁed in the shaded area. The optimal point —
denoted by A — corresponds to the highest value of e in the shaded area, and the optimal
legal standard ssi is the abscissa of point A. This is the intersection between the IC and PC
curves if the latter occurs inside the F constraint, as in Figure 3. Otherwise, the highest
feasible e corresponds to the intersection between the F and PC constraints, as in Figure 4,
where the IC constraint is slack.
Graphical analysis allows us to compare the optimal standard chosen by a self-interested
regulator with that chosen by a benevolent one. In Figures 3, 4 and 5, the solution that
would be chosen by a benevolent regulator, sc,l i e so nt h et h i c kp o r t i o no ft h eI Cc u r v e ,a t
23This yields de/ds =[ u
0(s) − c
0(s)]/αlp
0(e). When the ﬁrst-best condition u
0(s)=c
0(s) is met, this
derivative is zero and the second derivative is negative.
—1 9—a point determined by the tangency with the highest indiﬀerence curve (not drawn), unless
the F constraint is binding, in which case sc is at the intersection between the IC and F
constraint. Therefore, the legal standard ssi is weakly larger than sc in Figures 3 and 5,
while it can be either larger or smaller than sc in Figure 4. In other words, there are cases in
which a self-interested regulator may choose a lower legal standard than a benevolent one.
How does the optimal standard ssi react to an increase in corruption α?A ss h o w nb y
implicit diﬀerentiation of (17) and (16), an increase in α ﬂattens the rising portion of the
PC locus and steepens the IC locus, as shown by the dashed lines in the three ﬁgures. In
Figure 3, the intersection between these two loci moves down and to the left — from A to B.
In other words, if the F constraint is not binding, an increase in corruption reduces the legal
standard ssi chosen by the self-interested regulator, in contrast with the prediction of the
“tollbooth view”. Intuitively, when α increases, larger extortion by enforcers lowers ﬁrms’
incentives to abide by the law, which calls for a softer legal standard.
The opposite occurs in Figure 4: here the shift of the PC locus leads to a higher standard
ssi. Intuitively, to meet the increased extortion costs ﬁrms must raise the price of their goods,
which in turn requires a tighter standard. In this case, a tighter standard does not require
greater enforcement because the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding.
While in Figures 3 and 4 the IC curve intersects the increasing portion of the PC curve,
the intersection may occur in the decreasing portion of the latter. The latter case is shown in
Figure 5, where the highest enforcement is achieved at the maximum of the PC locus (point
A), which corresponds to the ﬁrst best qfb. (Recall however that with corrupt enforcers the
ﬁrst best does not maximize welfare.) The eﬀect of an increase in the degree of corruption α
is again represented as the shift from point A to point B: the ﬁgure shows that the standard
—2 0—is set at the ﬁrst-best level, and is invariant to the level of corruption. This discussion is
summarized and formally proved in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 If the regulator is self-interested, the optimal standard ssi is increasing or de-
creasing in the degree of corruption α, depending on whether the feasibility or the incentive
constraint binds. It is invariant to α if neither constraint binds.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Considering that the feasibility constraint is binding for low values of the endowment
y, this lemma predicts that in relatively poor countries the standard ssi chosen by a self-
interested regulator should be increasing in the degree of corruption α, in conformity to the
the “tollbooth view”, whereas this should not be the case in relatively rich ones. Building on
this lemma, the relationship between the optimal standard ssi and the degree of corruption
α can be fully characterized:
Proposition 3 (Standard with Self-Interested Regulator) The relationship between
the standard chosen by a self-interested regulator and corruption, ssi(α),i sa ni n v e r t e dU -
shaped curve, which has either a unique maximum b s = ssi(b α) or multiple maxima equal to
qfb over an interval [α1,α 2].
Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, when corruption is low so that bribes are moderate, ﬁrms can bear the cost
of meeting the legal standard and paying the implied bribes (the incentive constraint being
slack). In this region, more corruption is associated with tighter standards, so that the
“tollbooth view” applies. Conversely, when corruption is rampant, ﬁrms are so oppressed
by bribes that further increases in the greed of enforcers must be balanced by more lenient
—2 1—standards (the incentive constraint being binding). In this region, the “tollbooth view” does
not apply, because even for a self-interested regulator the main concern is to avoid “killing
the market”.
6 Environmental Standards
The analysis presented so far applies also to environmental standards. The need to im-
pose an environmental standard arises from a public-good problem, which on surface might
seem completely diﬀerent from the informational asymmetry that requires product quality
standards. However, the two problems are much more similar than they appear, to the
point that the decision problem for the government in the two settings is the same. In both
cases, government intervention is required to correct an externality in producers’ decisions,
a se x p l a i n e di nS e c t i o n2 .
Suppose, as before, that consumers care about two goods — a continuous numeraire good
and a lumpy good — and demand a single unit of the lumpy good and an amount x of the
numeraire. The production of the lumpy good aﬀects the quality of the environment: the
more polluting is production, the lower is its unit cost. As before, c(q) is increasing in q,
this time reinterpreted as the “environmental friendliness” of the technology. Therefore,
c(0) is the minimum production cost, corresponding to the most environmentally harmful
technology. Per-unit proﬁts are deﬁned as:
π = v(q) − c(q),
where v is the market price, to be determined by Bertrand competition.
In this reworking of the model, the value that the consumer places upon the quality
good is an increasing function of the quality of the environment, q,w h i c hi st h ea v e r a g e
—2 2—level chosen in the economy: q =
R 1
0 qdz. For concreteness, imagine that the quality good
is a vacation in a natural resort, where each hotel pollutes the environment to a diﬀerent
degree depending on the technology it chooses to process its waste. If the hotels’ choices
result in a better environmental quality q, consumers will draw greater satisfaction from a
vacation. Accordingly, the utility of consumers can be rewritten as:
U = x + u(q), (19)
where u(q) is the reservation value of the vacation for a given environmental quality q.F o r
each consumer, the pollution level chosen by the producer that he patronizes has a negligible
eﬀect on environmental quality q. Due to this externality, environmental quality is a public
good.
In this setting, without government intervention Bertrand competition leads to the lowest
environmental quality. The market price is bid down to the cost corresponding to the
cheapest and most polluting technology, i.e. v = c(0). This ineﬃciency can be remedied by
setting a minimum environmental standard s,s ot h a tq = s.
Firms will recover the implied increase in production costs by raising the price of the
lumpy good, and under perfect competition the whole increase will be passed on to con-
sumers through price. As in section 3.4, a benevolent government maximizes the utility of




U = x + u(s)
subject the incentive constraint (8) and the feasibility constraint (9). In the presence of cor-
rupt enforcers, the regulator will also have to take into account the consumers’ participation
constraint (17).
—2 3—This implies that the results reached in the previous sections also apply to the design
and enforcement of environmental standards. If these standards are chosen optimally, their
strictness should be positively related to the resources devoted to their enforcement, and
they should be higher in wealthier countries than in poorer ones. This is reminiscent of the
provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, according to which developed countries ought to bear the
entire ﬁnancial burden of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, while developing countries are
not bound to reduce future emissions, at least not immediately.
The results on corruption also carry over to environmental regulation. If governments
are benevolent, environmental standards and their enforcement should be less stringent
the greater the degree of corruption. If governments are self-interested, instead, the eﬀect
of corruption on environmental standards is predicted to be non-monotonic, that is, ﬁrst
increasing and then decreasing. In the following section we test these predictions using in-
ternational data on environmental regulation and enforcement and the degree of corruption.
7I n t e r n a t i o n a l E v i d e n c e
Our evidence concerns environmental standards, as measured by the two indicators proposed
by Porter, Sachs and Schwab (2001): (i) the “Environmental Governance” indicator, which
is the principal component of responses to several survey questions, touching on regulation
and enforcement, and (ii) the “Compliance with Environmental Agreements”, based on
survey responses. Data for these indicators are drawn from World Economic Forum (2002),
hereafter WEF, and are available for 70 countries. We merge these variables with a measure
of corruption drawn from the Transparency International database and a number of controls
(education, religion, political and geographical variables) to be used as instruments for
corruption. Detailed deﬁnitions and data sources are given in Appendix B.
—2 4—A prediction of the model is that the strictness of regulatory standards is positively
related with per-capita income, irrespective of the presence of corruption or the preferences
of the regulator. This is consistent with the data: Figure 6 suggests that the relationship
between Environmental Legislation and the logarithm of Income is positive and linear,
measuring regulatory standards via the variable Environmental Governance drawn from
WEF (2002).
[Insert Figure 6]
The data also allows us to explore the relationship between legal standards and cor-
ruption. In Figure 7, environmental standards appear to be negatively correlated with
corruption.
[Insert Figures 7]
To check the robustness of the simple correlations revealed by these ﬁgures, Table 1 re-
ports estimates obtained by regressing environmental standards on the logarithm of Income
and Corruption. In the OLS regressions reported in columns 1 and 3, the coeﬃcient of the
logarithm of Income is positive, that of Corruption is negative, and both are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at standard conﬁd e n c el e v e l s .T h es i z ea n ds i g n i ﬁcance of the coeﬃcient
of Corruption is not aﬀected by other control variables such as schooling, and there is no
evidence of a non-monotonic eﬀect of Corruption, the coeﬃcient of a quadratic term not
being signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. These robustness checks are not reported for brevity.
Therefore, OLS estimates conﬁrm the evidence of the bivariate plots.24
24We have obtained similar results on a negative correlation between corruption and the strictness of
—2 5—[Insert Table 1]
However, these estimates may be aﬀected by endogeneity problems, in keeping with
the model, where both legal standards and bribes are endogenous variables. Hausman
tests reject the null hypothesis of OLS consistency in the regression reported in column
1. Therefore we re-estimate the regressions using Schooling, Civil Rights, Latitude and
Religion dummies as instrumental variables (IV). In all the IV regressions, the estimated
coeﬃcient of Income, though positive, is no longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The
coeﬃcient of Corruption remains negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
All these correlations are consistent with our model, under the assumption of a benev-
olent regulator.25 Instead, it is not consistent with the model’s prediction for the case of
a self-interested regulator, where over some range the correlation between corruption and
legal standards should be positive. By the same token, the evidence contrasts with the
prediction that DLLS (2002) associate with the tollbooth view.
It may appear puzzling that the empirical correlation between environmental regulation
and corruption is opposite to that documented by DLLS for the regulation of entry, as
measured by the number of procedures required for a start-up company to obtain legal
status. This diﬀerence may stem from two characteristics of environmental regulation.
environmental regulation by using another cross-country data set, which covers a small set of countries but
provides accurate survey-based measures of the strictness of regulation. These measures are constructed
from environmental reports presented to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) in 1992. The data refer to 32 randomly selected countries of the 145 for which UNCED reports
were presented.
25Admittedly our estimates are also consistent with other interpretations. For instance, the positive
correlation between environmental standards and per capita income may mean that environmental protection
is a luxury good — the so-called “environmental Kuznets curve” discussed by Dasgupta, Laplante, Wang,
and Wheeler (2002). And the negative correlation between environmental standards and corruption could
arise from producers’ lobbying for lower environmental compliance costs, insofar as they can appropriate
these cost savings in the form of extra proﬁts. In terms of our model, this would require ﬁr m st oh a v es o m e
market power.
—2 6—First, in this area international treaties make it more diﬃcult for self-interested regulators
to misbehave, so that regulation may be more inspired to the pursuit of social welfare than
in other areas. Second, environmental regulation, being relatively new, may be less aﬀected
than entry regulation by deep-seated features of legal systems — such as formalism — that
may have fostered corruption. Indeed, especially in developing countries much regulation
inherited from the past is due to legal transplant by colonizers or to mechanical imitation of
foreign models by national regulators. In other words, the globalized nature of environmental
regulation and its relative novelty can explain why it is closer to the optimal pattern, whereas
in other ﬁelds of regulation corrupt countries appear to impose tighter or more formalistic
regulation.26
8C o n c l u s i o n
Entitling people to rights entails the budgetary costs of enforcing such rights (Holmes and
Sunstein, 1999). This implies that regulators must trade the beneﬁt of a stricter legal
standard oﬀ against the cost of its enforcement. As a result, legal standards and enforcement
are complements. Since enforcement activity depends both on available tax revenue and on
the honesty of enforcers, the optimal legal standard is increasing in per-capita income and
decreasing in oﬃcials’ corruption. These results hold if the regulator maximizes social
welfare.
In contrast, a self-interested regulator may respond to greater corruption either by tight-
ening or by relaxing legal standards, depending on per-capita income and the degree of cor-
ruption. In particular, we show that the legal standard chosen by a self-interested regulator
26See for instance Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) for procedural formalism or
Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) for the regulation of labor.
—2 7—is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing in the degree of corruption.
The intuitive rationale for the non-monotonic relationship between legal standard and
corruption is that, when corruption is low, ﬁrms can bear the cost of meeting the legal
standard and paying the implied bribes. In this region, more corruption will be associated
with tighter standards, as predicted by the “tollbooth view” of regulation. When instead
corruption is rampant, ﬁrms are so oppressed by bribes that further increases in the greed
of enforcers must be balanced by more lenient standards, because even a self-interested
regulator is concerned about “killing the market”. The latter result contrasts with the
“tollbooth view” of regulation.
Our framework can be used to analyze diﬀerent regulations. We apply it to product
quality standards (when consumers cannot observe quality) and to environmental standards
(when consumers do not internalize the cost of pollution).
International evidence on environmental regulation shows that standards correlate posi-
tively with per-capita income, and negatively with corruption. This result is consistent with
the model’s predictions for benevolent governments, and contrasts with previous evidence
documenting that in other areas of regulation the stringency of rules correlates positively
with corruption. This diﬀerence in results may reﬂect the eﬀect of international treaties,
which make it harder for self-interested regulators to misbehave in the area of environmental
regulation. It may also reﬂect the more recent nature of this body of regulation, which may
be less aﬀected by mechanical imitation of foreign norms.
—2 8—Appendix A. Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .The problem is to maximize u(s)−c(s)+y−e e(s;α) subject to
the incentive constraint (16), the participation constraint (17) and the feasibility constraint
(9). Upon replacing e e(s;α) from (16), the participation and feasibility constraints become:
u(s) > c(s)/(1 − α) (A1)
and
y > e e(s;α)+c(s). (A2)
To show that the claim that the optimal standard sc is decreasing in the degree of
corruption α,c o n s i d e rt w ov a l u e sα1and α2, such that α2 >α 1, and suppose that, contrary
to the claimed result, the corresponding values of sc are s2 > s1 > 0. The proof proceeds in
two steps: ﬁrst, we show that under these assumptions both previous constraints are slack,
so that sc is determined by the ﬁrst-order condition; second, that this condition implies
s2 <s 1 and thus a contradiction.
F i r s t ,t os h o wt h a tt h ec o n s t r a i n t( A 1 )i ss l a c k ,w en o t et h a t
u(s2) − c(s2)/(1 − α1) >u (s2) − c(s2)/(1 − α2) > 0. (A3)
The function u(s) − c(s)/(1 − α) is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing in s, and it equals
zero for s =0(no intervention) and for a value s>0 (intervention). As we focus on s>0,
i.e. on the positive root of the equation, we have u0(s)−c0(s)/(1−α) < 0. This together with
(A3) implies that u(s1)−c(s1)/(1−α1) > u(s2)−c(s2)/(1−α1) >u (s2)−c(s2)/(1−α2) > 0.
Next, to show that the constraint (A1) is also slack, recall that c(s) is increasing in s and
e e(s;α) is increasing in s and in α,s ot h a ty > e e(s2;α2)+c(s2) > e e(s1;α1)+c(s1).
—2 9—Therefore, s1 is determined by the interior optimum u0(s1)−c0(s1)−e e0(s1;α1)=0 .S i n c e
e e(s1;α1) is convex in s, it follows that
u0(s2) − c0(s2) − e e0(s2;α2) 6 u0(s1) − c0(s1) − e e0(s1;α2) <u 0(s1) − c0(s1) − e e0(s1;α1)=0 ,
implying that the regulator would improve welfare by adopting a lower standard than s2 at
the corruption level α2. (The previous arguments imply that (A2) and (A1) are still satisﬁed
when s is lowered.) The contradiction completes the proof of the claim that a larger α is
associated with a lower sc.
Next, to show the claim that the optimal standard sc is weakly increasing in the income
level y, note that if the constraint (A2) is slack, the sc is determined by the ﬁrst-order
condition and is unaﬀected by y. If instead the constraint (A2) is binding, it is immediate
that a larger y requires an increase in sc.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . As stated in the text, in this regime the regulator wants to
choose the largest e consistent with the incentive compatibility, feasibility and participa-
tion constraints. Note ﬁrst that the constraint (A1) must bind: otherwise, the regulator
could reduce s to slacken the incentive compatibility constraint (16) and the participation
constraint (A2), and thereby increase e. Moreover, generically at most two of the three
constraints can bind. So there are three possibilities:
(i) if the constraint (A2) binds, s is increasing in α; (ii) if (16) binds, s is decreasing in
α; and (iii) if neither constraint (A2) nor constraint (16) binds, s is independent of α.
In case (i), which corresponds to Figure 4, the optimal standard solves the two equations
y − c(ssi)=e (F) and u(ssi) − c(ssi)=αp(e)l (PC). Upon substituting (F) in (PC) and





u0(ssi) − c0(ssi)+αc0(ssi)p0(y − c(ssi))l
.
The numerator of this derivative is positive, as the probability p(y − c(ssi)) > 0.T h e
denominator is also positive, since u0(ssi)−c0(ssi) > 0 for ssi <q fb.27 Hence, the derivative
is positive. In case (ii), which corresponds to Figure 3, the optimal standard solves the two
equations (1−α)p(e)l−c(ssi)=0(IC) and u(ssi)−c(ssi)−αp(e)l =0(PC). To show that





u0(ssi) − c0(ssi)/(1 − α)
,
which is negative because the numerator is positive and the denominator is negative by the
argument oﬀered after inequality (A3) in the proof of Proposition 2. In case (iii), which
corresponds to Figure 5, the optimal standard must only satisfy the equation u(ssi)−c(ssi)=
αp(e)l (PC). In this case, for any α maximizing e is tantamount to maximizing u(ssi)−c(ssi),
which requires ssi = qfb. Hence, ssi is invariant to α.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . For brevity, in what follows we will refer to the incentive
constraint (16) as IC, the participation constraint (17) as PC and the feasibility constraint
( 9 )a sF .N o t et h a ti nt h es p a c e(s,e) shown in Figures 3, 4 and 5, the IC curve is increasing
in α, the PC curve is decreasing in α, and the F curve is independent of α. Two possible
cases can arise:
(1) There exists a value of α such that F, PC and IC are simultaneously binding: graph-
ically all three loci intersect for a triple (b s,b e, b α) and the intersection occurs in the increasing
27Suppose in fact that s
si >q







(F) and (PC) equations imply that the value of e corresponding to q
si exceeds that corresponding to q
fb.
Since by lowering s
si the government can increase e and still satisfy both (F) and (PC), it follows that the
optimal standard s
si must be lower than q
fb.
—3 1—portion of the PC curve or at its maximum qfb (otherwise the regulator would want to de-
crease s and increase e, while still respecting IC and F). This intersection is unique because
IC is increasing and convex, PC is increasing and concave, and F is decreasing. For α>b α,
PC and IC remain binding (while F becomes slack), so that a higher α is associated with a
lower ssi, as shown in Lemma 1 and illustrated in Figure 3. For α<b α, F and PC remain
binding (while IC becomes slack), so that a higher α is associated with a lower ssi,a ss h o w n
in Lemma 1 and illustrated in Figure 4. Hence, ssi achieves a maximum at b s for α = b α.
(2) There exists no value of α such that F, PC and IC are simultaneously binding:
graphically, there is no point where F, PC and IC all intersect in the increasing portion of
PC. In this case, there exist α1 and α2 >α 1 such that the optimal standard ssi is increasing
in α up to qfb for α ∈ (0,α 1), constant at qfb for α ∈ [α1,α 2], and decreasing in α for
α ∈ (α2,1). To show this, one must distinguish three sub-cases:
(2a) PC is binding, while F and IC are not. Graphically, this occurs if the IC curve
intersects the PC curve in its decreasing portion, while F is slack (as in Figure 5). In this
case, the optimal standard ssi corresponds to the maximum of the PC curve, qfb,w h e r ee is
maximal. As α decreases, shifting the PC curve upwards and the IC curve downwards, we get
to the point where F intersects PC at its maximum qfb. We denote the corresponding value
of α by α1 =[ u(qfb)−c(qfb)]/p(y−c(qfb))l>0. Conversely, as α increases, the intersection
between these ultimately occurs at the maximum qfb. We denote the corresponding value
of α by α2 =[ u(qfb) − c(qfb)]/u(qfb) < 1. For all values of α between α1 and α2,o n l yP C
is binding, so that ssi is constant at qfb, as shown in Lemma 1 and illustrated in Figure 5.
(2b) For α<α 1 F and PC are binding, while IC is not. Graphically, this must occur
at a point where the F curve intersect the PC curve in its increasing portion, as in Figure
—3 2—4 (otherwise it would be possible to decrease s and increase e, while still respecting IC and
F). In this case, the optimal standard ssi corresponds to the intersection of the F and PC
curves. Hence, for α<α 1 ah i g h e rα is associated with a higher ssi, as shown in Lemma 1
and illustrated in Figure 4.
(2c) For α>α 2 IC and PC are binding, while F is not. Graphically, this occurs if the
IC and PC curves intersect each other below the F curve and the intersection occurs in the
increasing portion of the PC curve (as in Figure 3). This intersection, which identiﬁes the
optimal standard ssi, is unique since the PC curve is concave and the IC curve is convex in
s. Hence, for α>α 2 ah i g h e rα is associated with a lower ssi,a ss h o w ni nL e m m a1a n d
illustrated in Figure 3.
—3 3—Appendix B. Deﬁnitions and Sources of Variables
Environmental Governance: principal component of responses to several survey
questions touching on air pollution regulation, chemical waste regulation, clarity and stabil-
ity of regulations, ﬂexibility of regulations, environmental regulatory innovation, leadership
in environmental policy, stringency of environmental regulations, consistency of regulation
enforcement, regulatory stringency, toxic waste disposal regulations, and water pollution
regulations. This variable is available for 70 countries. Source: Porter, Sachs and Schwab
(2001) as reported in World Economic Forum (2002).
Compliance with Environmental Agreements: indicator obtained from survey
reactions to the statement: “compliance with international environmental agreements is a
high priority”. Survey responses range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7. This variable is
available for 56 countries. Source: Porter, Sachs and Schwab (2001) as reported in World
Economic Forum (2002).
Corruption: misuse of public power for private beneﬁts, e.g., bribing of public oﬃcials,
kickbacks in public procurement or embezzlements of public funds, as of 1999. The index
averages the corruption scores given by the following sources: 1) Freedom House Nations
in Transit; 2) Gallup International; 3) The Economist Intelligence Unit; 4) the Institute
for Management Development, Lausanne; 5) the International Crime Victim Survey; 6) the
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Hong Kong; 7) the Wall Street Journal, Central
European Economic Review, 8) the World Bank and University of Basel; 9) the World
Economic Forum. The original index is the “corruption perception index” produced by
Transparency International and is a descending score from 1 (most corrupt) to 10 (least
corrupt). We rescale it so that our “corruption” variable equals 1 for the least and 10
—3 4—for the most corrupt countries. In 1999 this variable is available for 92 countries. Source:
www.transparency.de.
Income: GDP per capita, constant prices (1995), average of 1994-98. Available for 117
countries. Source: Penn World Table 6.0 (PWT 6.0).
Religion: measures of the religious composition of the population that identify for the
year 1980 the percentage of the population that is (1) Roman Catholic, (2) Protestant, and
(3) Muslim, available for 85 countries. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998) using data from World Christian Encyclopedia 1982, Worldmark Encyclope-
dia of Nations 1995, Statistical Abstract of the World 1995, Demographic Yearbook 1995,
CIA World Factbook 1996.
Schooling: average years of schooling in the total population over age 25 in
1980, as described by Barro and Lee (1996). Available for 77 countries. Source:
http://www.nber.org/pub/barro.lee.
Latitude: the absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values between
0 and 1. Available for 85 countries. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
(1998) using data from CIA Factbook.
Civil Rights: index of civil liberties, average for the 1980s, Scale from
1 (most freedom) to 7 (least freedom). Available for 81 countries. Source:
http://www.nber.org/pub/barro.lee.
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—3 8—Table 1. Regression Results
The dependent variable is Environmental Governance (WEF data) in regressions 1 and
2, and Compliance with Environmental Agreements (WEF data) in regressions 3 and 4.
Regressions 1, 3 and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares. Regressions 2 and 4
are estimated with instrumental variables. The instruments are Schooling, Civil Rights,
Latitude and Religion dummies. The Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis that OLS
estimates are consistent in regressions 3, but rejects it at the 5 percent level in regression 1.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, and 1
percent level, respectively.
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method OLS IV OLS IV
Constant -1.44* 0.42 -0.27 -0.52
(0.75) (1.40) (1.02) (1.72)
Log per-capita GDP 0.30*** 0.14 0.17* 0.20
(0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15)
Corruption -0.21*** -0.33*** -0.27*** -0.30***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09)
Adjusted R2 0.837 0.819 0.729 0.780
Number of observations 66 49 56 46
—3 9— 
Government sets 




product quality q. 
Consumers buy  





standard (q=s) with 
probability p(e). 




























Figure 2: Second-best legal standard and enforcement
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Figure 4: Legal standard and enforcement with a self-interested regulator (case 2)
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Figure 7: Environmental Governance (WEF data) and Corruption
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